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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature ofthe Case 
This is a case brought by the Bank of Commerce (hereinafter referred to as "Bank"), to 
foreclose real estate mortgages against Appellant, Jefferson Enterprises, LLC, (hereinafter 
"Jefferson").] The case before this Court is an appeal from the decision of the District Court 
granting the Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Jefferson's Counterclaims. 
J efferson's counterclaim and affinnative defenses raise factual issues based upon breach of 
contract, interference with a prospective contract, fraud and misrepresentation, and promissory 
estoppel. Jefferson also raised an affinnative defense in its Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
(the illegality of the Bank's actions) that was not addressed by the Bank in its motion for 
summary judgment or the District Court in its decision dismissing Jefferson's counterclaim. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Bank filed an action to foreclose two mortgages that were entered into by the 
Jefferson. The Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the District Court to enter 
judgment in its favor, or in the alternative, to grant Jefferson partial summary judgment on the 
grounds that there were no genuine issue of material fact and it should be entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter oflaw. 
The Jefferson responded to the Motion with affidavits, depositions and memoranda of 
law. Following oral argument, the District COUli granted the Motion, dismissed the Jefferson's 
Counterclaim and entered judgment in favor of the Bank. Thereafter, the Jefferson timely moved 
the Court for an order vacating the judgment and for reconsideration. The motion after briefing 
1 Designation of the parties used by the trial court LAR. 35(d) 
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and argument was denied. As a result Jefferson has appealed from the January 17, 2012, 
Memorandum Decision and Order; the January 17, 2012. Judgment, the April 19, 2012, 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Reconsider; the April 19, 2012, Decree of 
Foreclosure and Order of Sale; the April 19, 2012, Memorandum Decision and Order on 
Attorney Fees and Costs; and the April 19,2012, Judgment Re: Attorney Fees & Costs. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Dustin Morrison is the owner and managing member of Jefferson. Dustin Morrison is 
also the owner and managing member of American Dream Home Builders, LLC, an Idaho 
Limited Liability Company nlk/a ADHD, LLC. The LLC is in the business of developing 
residential subdivisions and constructing residential homes. Dustin Morrison is also the sole 
shareholder and officer of American Dream Construction, Inc. The corporation is in the business 
of developing residential subdivisions and constructing residential homes in conjunction with 
American Dream. Jefferson Enterprises and the other described entities are interrelated to the 
extent that their common financial ability to succeed is influenced by the ongoing projects, 
monetary reserves and credit worthiness of all of the entities.2 The bank relied upon the financial 
relationship of Jefferson, Dustin Morrison, and the other related entities in its decision to loan 
money to Jefferson. 
In May of 2005, Jefferson became the sole owner and managing member of Southern 
Hills Development Co., LLC. Southern Hills was the owner of an option to purchase real 
2 Depo. Wortonpp. 18; Clerk's Record p. 396. Depo. M. Morrison pp. 
45; Clerk's Record p. 333. The bank relied upon the financial 
relationship of Jefferson, Dustin Morrison, and the other related entities 
in its decision to loan money to Jefferson. 
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property which is referred to as the "Wood" parcel. Southem Hills was also the owner of a 
substantial portion of the 80 Acres, Inc., a subdivision of the City of Pocatello, Idaho (referred to 
as the "80 Acre" parcel). All of the rights, title and interest in Southem Hills and in the Wood 
and 80 Acre parcels were transferred to Jefferson. 
The 80 Acre parcel was subject to a financing arrangement with exceptionally favorable 
terms and conditions. The terms of the financing included a very low interest rate that was 
capitalized into the note together with low annual payments. 3 Jefferson assumed those favorable 
financial arrangements. According to Dustin Morrison "there was not one dollar incentive to pay 
that off one day early. ,,4 
In the early part of 2006, Jefferson negotiated with the Bank through one of its Vice 
Presidents, Steve Worton, for the purpose of the obtaining financing to exercise the option and to 
purchase the Wood property. Prior to the negotiations with the Bank, a "Master Plan" for 
development of the Southem Hills Project combining the Wood parcel and the 80 Acre parcel 
had been submitted and approved by the City of Pocatello. At the time, the plan was the largest 
single development in southeastem Idaho.s At the time the loan was being negotiated with the 
Bank, an iillnexation Agreement was being negotiated between Morrison and the City of 
Pocatello. Among other things, the Annexation Agreement provided for utilities, sewer and the 
joint development of a water system that included at least two large water storage tanks. 
Compliance with the tenns of the Master Plan and the Almexation Agreement obligated 
Jefferson to spend millions of dollars to comply and complete the development. Jefferson and the 
related entities spent large sums of money for the 80 Acre property acquisition, engineering, 
3 Depo. Worton Ex. 21; Clerk's Record p. 418 
4 Depo. D. Morrison pp. 28-29; Clerk's Record p. 459 
5 Depo. D. Morrison. p.25; Clerk's Record p. 458 
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surveying, preparation of plats and other actions necessary to obtain the Annexation Agreement 
and the approval of the City of Pocatello for the Southem Hills Master Plan.6 
A loan proposal was submitted by the Morrisons and Jefferson to the Bank for the 
purpose of funding the purchase of the Wood property. The deadline to exercise the option to 
purchase the property was May 10, 2006. The owner of the property was not willing to extend 
the option past the deadline. In the event the option was not exercised and the Wood property not 
purchased, Jefferson would not be able to develop the Southem Hills Project and the 
expenditures described above would be lost. Wood had extended the option on two other 
occasions but refused any further extensions.7 
The loan proposal included volumes of documents relating to the Southem Hills Project 
together with tax retums, financial analysis, appraisals, and projected profits. Interestingly the 
Bank accepted the Jefferson documents and treated the same as the loan application.s 
The application provided that the Bank's position would be subject to the 80 Acre 
mortgage. Some time prior to May 8, 2006, Steve Worton, on behalf of the Bank, infonlled 
Jefferson that the loan pertaining to the Southem Hills Project had been approved by the Bank. 
The only variance from the written request made by Jefferson was that the amount of the loan 
would be reduced to approximately $2,200,000.00 and the tenn of the loan would be for one 
year. The Bank's communicated approval specifically recognized the written application made by 
Jefferson which provided, among other things, that the Bank would have a second mortgage on 
the 80 Acre parcel. The acceptance of the application on the stated basis preserved the favorable 
financing arrangement enjoyed by Jefferson as well as leaving intact other liquid assets of 
6 Depo. D. Morrison. p. 25. 26; Clerk's Record p. 458-159 
7 Depo. D. Morrison. pp. 32-33; Clerk's Record p. 492 
8 Depo. p. Worton p. 19; Clerk's Record p. 394 
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Jefferson, the related entities and the Morrisons. The liquid assets were needed for the 
completion of the Southem Hills project and to fund other ongoing real estate developments of 
the other related entities.9 
The Ba..11k recognized the financial interrelationship of Jefferson to the other business 
entities of the Morrisons combining the financial information to determine debt to asset ratios, 
capacity and working capital. Based upon the written application, the Bank, through Steve 
Worton, acknowledged acceptance. Jefferson had a clear understanding that the new loan from 
the Bank would be subordinate to the existing 1 st mortgage on the 80 Acre parcel. Jefferson 
accepted the modified terms and discontinued the pursuit of other financing options with DL 
Evans Bank. Following the communication of acceptance from the Bank and less than 48 hours 
prior to the time the option on the Wood parcel was to expire, the Bank changed its position and 
demanded that it be placed in a first lien position on the 80 Acre parcel. Jefferson was facing the 
prospect of catastrophic loss if the Wood option was not exercised. Jefferson was compelled by 
the wrongful acts of the Bank at the last hour to use substantially all of its liquid assets and the 
liquid assets of the related entities to payoff the obligation on the 80 Acre parcel thereby placing 
the Bank's mortgage in a first lien position on the property. 
The Bank admits that its actions impacted the financial ability of Jefferson and the other 
related businesses to continue their operations by consuming its liquid financial capacity to 
continue the project or obtain additional investment to complete the project. The Bank's 
procedures required that the financial ability of a borrower such as Jefferson be analyzed to 
determine if it would qualify for the loan. The Bank in its deposition explained the scope of the 
9 Depo. Wake pp.23-24; Clerk's Record p. 427 
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analysis. 10 Jefferson's combined financial infonnation met the lending criteria of the Bank based 
upon the assumption that the capacity and working capital would not be reduced. However, when 
the Bank demanded that Jefferson use its working capital to payoff the 80 Acre mortgage the 
financial ability of Jefferson to service the loan was compromised. Under these circumstances 
the Bank would not have approved the loan. 11 
Jefferson's loss in liquidity capacity and working capital was caused by the Bank's 
breach of the agreement to lend leaving the favorable 80 Acre financing in place with its 
insistence on being in first position of 80 Acre parcel. The breach caused damages to Jefferson's 
credit worthiness and stifled Jefferson's ability to attract other investment in the propertyI2. 
As a further inducement Worton represented that the Bank would not let Jefferson fail and would 
provide a means to replace the loss of working capital and financial ability. (D. Morrison Depo. 
pp.70-73.) 
The representation by the Bank through Worton was made prior to the time the loan was 
to close and the time the Wood parcel was to be purchased. Worton induced Jefferson to follow 
this course of action by misrepresenting that the Bank would not let Jefferson fail and would 
provide additional financing. The Bank refused to provide any additional financing to Jefferson 
for the completion of the Southern Hills Project. As a result of the Bank's blatant deviation from 
its own policies and procedures and commonly recognized lending standards and other wrongful 
conduct, Jefferson lost the ability to take advantage of foreseeable prospective economic 
opportunities related to the 80 Acre parcel, the Southern Hills Project and other real estate 
developments. 
10 Depo. M. Morrison pp.64-69; Clerk's Record p. 352-358 
11 Depo. Worton p. 73; Clerk's Record p. 409 
12 Depo. D. Morrison p. 77-78; Clerk's Record p 440-441 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
A. The District Court erred in granting the Motion for SummarY Judgment dismissing the 
Counterclaim of Jefferson in that establish: 
1. There are disputed material issues of fact and issues of law that show the Plaintiff 
breached its contract with Jefferson; 
2. The Bank intentionally interfered with a prospective economic advantage of Jefferson; 
3. The Bank's action was barred by the doctrine of promissory estoppel; 
5. The Bank committed fraud and misrepresentation; 
4. That Jefferson was damaged by the actions of the Bank; 
5. The District Court's detenninations dismissing the affinnative defenses raised by the 
Jefferson on the Bank's Motion for Summary judgment were erroneous and not based upon 
substantial evidence. 
6. The District Court erred in deternlining that the Bank's Mortgage should be foreclosed 
in that there are disputed materials of fact that would have precluded the entry of summary 
judgment allowing the foreclosure. 
B. Request for Attornev Fees as an Issue on Appeal. 
1. Plaintiff requests an award of reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the provisions of 
LC.§12-120(3) and LA.R. Rule 41. 
III. ARGUMENT. 
A. Standard of Review. 
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On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary jud2::,'menL this Court utilizes the same 
standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Shavliver 1'. 
Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004). Smmnary judgment is 
proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(c). Movant has the burden of shO\ving that no 
genuine issues of material fact exist. Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 2j, 149 Idaho 679, 683, 
239 P.3d 784,788 (2010). This Court "liberally construe[sJ the record in a light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of that party." Vv'hen 
ruling on a motion for summary judbTInent, disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of 
the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be 
drawn in favor of the non-moving party. SUlmnary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact. When the record shows the existence of genuine and 
material issues of fact and the record contains conflicting inferences or if reasonable minds might 
reach different conclusions the moving party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 591, 249 P.3d 390 (Idaho,2011). Summary judgment is appropliate 
"if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts and reasonable inferences are 
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 525, 
96 P.3d 623, 626 (2004). 
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The court is not pennitted to make conclusive findings with regard to issues upon which 
the parties submit conflicting evidence. See Williams v. COlnputer Res., Inc., 123 Idaho 671, 673, 
851 P.2d 967, 969 (1993) (holding that the trial court was not pennitted to draw inferences 
regarding the parties' intent when the parties submitted conflicting evidence on the issue); Ashby 
1". Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 70, 593 P.2d 402,405 (1979) (holding that a question involving the 
"intention expressed by the acts and statements of the parties" was a factual question for the 
jury); Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670-71, 691 P.1d 1283, 1285-86 (et. App. 1984) 
(holding that findings based on conflicting evidence may only be made on summary judgment 
when "the evidence is entirely confined to a written record, there is no additional, in-court 
testimony to be obtained, and the trial judge alone will be responsible for choosing the 
evidentiary facts he deems most probable"). [W]hen a party moves for summary judgment, the 
initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with that pmiy. 
Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960,963 (1994) ("The burden of proving the 
absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving party."); See also Harris v. State, 
Deplt. of Health & We{fare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992); McCoy v. Lyons, 
120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360,364 (1991); G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 
514,517,808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). Thus, it follows that if the moving party fails to challenge an 
element of the nomnovant's case, the initial burden placed on the moving party has not been met 
and therefore does not shift to the nonmovant. 
The admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold matter to be addressed by the court 
before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to detennine whether the 
evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 
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Idaho 10,13,175 P.3d 172,175 (2007) (citing Carnell.,. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 
327, 48 P.3d 651, 656 (2002)). "This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when 
reviewing a trial court's determination of the admissibility of testimony offered in connection 
with a motion for summary judf,'1nent." Id. at 15. 175 P.3d at 177 (citing McDaniel)'. Inland 
Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 221, 159 P.3d 856, 858 (2007)). "A 
trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) 
acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the 
decision through an exercise of reason." O'Connor)'. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 
188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008) (citing West Wood 1711'S., Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82, 106 P.3d 
401,408 (2005)); Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237,280 P.3d 740, (2012). 
B. Breach of Contract. 
The District Court determined that Jefferson's claim for breach of contract was barred by 
operation of the "Statute of Frauds,,13 The District Court in its Memorandum Decision and order 
specifically found as follows: "This Court has also accepted as true that the conditions of the 
loan agreement provided, among other things, that the Bank would be secured on the 80 Acre 
parcel in a second priority position. In addition, this Court accepted as true that Jefferson had 
made application for a loan in the amount of $2,800,000 from the Bank. ,,14 The Bank agreed 
to loan money to Jefferson in accordance with the tenns and conditions of the Board's approval 
of Jefferson's loan application. The conditions of the loan agreement provided, among other 
things, that the Bank would be secured on the 80 Acre parcel in a second lien priority position 
13r. C. § 5-905 
14 Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion to Reconsider p. 5; 
Clerk's Record p. 722 
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subject to the existing advantageous financing on the parcel. The Mortgage prepared by the Bank 
\\'ith and effective date of May 9,2006 specifically provided that: 
"6. rrARRANTY OF TITLE. "Mortgagor covenants that Mortgager is lm-t:fully 
seized of the estate conveyed by this Mortgage and has the right to grant, 
bargain, conveJ', sell and mortgage this Propert), and warrants that the 
Property is unencumbered except for encumbrances of record. 
* * * 
8. PRIOR SECURITY INTERESTS. With regard to any other mortgage, deed 
of trust, security agreement or other lien document that created a security 
interest on encumbrance on the Property and that may have priority over this 
Mortgage, Mortgagor agrees: 
A. To make all payments when due and to peTform or comply with all 
covenants. 
B. To promptly deliver to Lender any notices that the Mortgagor 
receives from the holder. 
C. Not make orpermit any modification or extension of, and not request 
or accept any future advances under any note or agreement secured by, the 
other mortgage,deed of trust or security agreement unless Lender consents in 
writing". 15 
Jefferson accepted the Bank's Mortgage and the material tenns, including the second priority 
position, became binding on the Bank. Therefore, based upon the factual findings of the District 
Court, a written agreement (the Mortgage) existed and was effective on May 9, 2006. The 
Mortgage provided that encumbrances of record, such as the 80 Acre encumbrance, would have 
priority over the lien of the Bank's Mortgage. The District Court, even though there was 
substantial evidence in the record to the contrary, disposed of the breach of contract count based 
upon the Statute of Frauds. The District Courts detem1ination that the statute of frauds barred 
recovery, taking into account the factual finding referred to in this brief, is clearly erroneous and 
unsupported. 
The agreement found to exist by the District Court, by operation of law, contains the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing together with the requirements, established 
15 Mortgage Clerk's Transcript p. 14 
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policies and procedures of the Bank and its Board and recognized commercial lending standards 
and practices. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is " ... implied by law in the 
parties' contract." Idaho Power Co. Y. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216 
(2000). The covenant "arises only regarding terms agreed to by the parties." Taylor y. Browning, 
129 Idaho 483, 490, 927 P.2d 873, 880 (1996) (citing Idaho First Nat'!. Bank v. Bliss Valley 
Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 288,824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991)). "The covenant requires that the parties 
perfonn, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their agreement". Idaho Power Co., 134 Idaho 
738,750,9 p.3d 1204, 1216. The detennination of whether the covenant has been breached is an 
objective detennination of whether the parties have acted in good faith in tenns of enforcing the 
contractual provisions. Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 243 P .3d 1069 
(2010). The Bank breached the tenns and conditions of the lending agreement by changing its 
position and requiring Jefferson to payoff the existing loan on the 80 Acre parcel. The change 
of position of the Barlie was timed in such a marmer that Jefferson was unable to seek alternate 
financing to exercise the option to purchase the Wood property. Based upon the documentation 
contained in the loan application, confirmed by the terms of the Mortgage and other information 
provided to the Bar1k by Morrisons and Jefferson, it was reasonably foreseeable that the breach 
would cause damages to Jefferson. 
The Bank attempts to use the Statute of Frauds argument to shield itself from what it 
claims are oral agreements about the issue of priority. However, the statements of the Bar1k 
about the Bank's requirement of priority of the Mortgage are in fact barred by the Statute of 
Limitation. The Bank did not provide a writing to Jefferson at any time prior to the day of the 
closing that informed Jefferson that the Bank would require the subordination of the 80 Acre 
mortgage or that it would have to be in a first security position on the property. The oral 
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demands of the Bank forcing Jefferson to payoff the 80 Acre encumbrance did not exist in 
writing prior to the effective date of the Mortgage. 
C. Interference with a Prospective Economic Advantage. 
The District Court found that: "The Court finds that there was a valid economic 
expectancy by Jefferson and that the Bank was aware of that expectanc.v. " The Bank, acting 
contrary to its established policies and procedures and recognized commercial lending standards, 
wrongfully breached the terms and conditions of the loan agreement based upon the acceptance 
of Jefferson's documentation. The change in the Bank's position, requiring Jefferson to use 
existing liquid cash reserves to place the Bank in a first position on the 80 Acre parcel, materially 
interfered with Jefferson's foreseeable prospective economic advantage stemming from the 
favorable existing financing on the property, the business opportunities of the related entities 
owned by the Morrisons and its ability to complete the Southern Hills project. 
Interference with a prospective economic advantage can be demonstrated by showing (1) 
the existence of a valid economic expectancy, (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the 
interferer, (3) intentional interference inducing ternlination of the expectancy, (4) the 
interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself, (5) 
resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted. Cantvvell v. City of 
Boise, 146 Idaho 127, at 138, 191 P.3d 205, at 216, Idaho. 
The decision of the District Court found that Jefferson had a valid the economIC 
expectancy." The expectancy resulted from the favorable financial conditions of the 80 Acre 
financing agreement and the preservation of Jefferson financial capacity to service the loan with 
the Bank and to continue to operate the businesses of the related entities. The District Court also 
found that the Bank had knowledge of the expectancy in that, by its own calculations, it knew of 
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the advantage enjoyed by Jefferson and knew that Jefferson's financial capacity would be 
negatively impacted by its actions to change its position on the loan just before it was to close. 
The Bank had knowledge that the financial basis for extending the loan was thwarted by the 
demand that the 80 Acre encumbrance be paid off from the working capital of Jefferson and the 
related entities which was relied upon by the Bank to approve the loan. The Barile's intentional 
actions to require the 80 Acre parcel loan to be paid off with full knowledge of the economic 
consequences was intentional interference inducing tennination of the economic expectancy. 
The Bank's intentional breach of the tenus of the loan agreement found to exist by the District 
Court and the specific ternlS of the Mortgage was wrongful. The Bank followed a course of 
action that crippled the financial capacity of Jefferson. Finally, the Bank's actions in reducing 
Jefferson's ability to service the Bank's loan and either market or develop the Southern Hills 
project disrupted the economic expectancy and caused obvious damage to Jefferson. Jefferson 
had no operating capital. The favorable financing ternlS on the 80 Acre parcel were lost. 
Jefferson's ability to obtain credit or other sources of capital were lost, the financial ability of 
Jefferson's related entities was lost. Jefferson was unable to meet the obligation to the Bank, was 
required to borrow more money to pay the interest on the loan. All of these consequences of the 
Banks actions caused catastrophic loss to Jefferson. 
A party claiming intentional inteIference resulting in wrongful injury, may offer proof 
that either "(1) the defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harnl the plaintiff; or (2) 
the defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business relationship." 
Idaho First Nat'! Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 286, 824 P.2d 841,861 (1991). 
However, an enforceable contract need not be shown to exist, just a valid economic expectancy. 
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex A1. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 217, 177 P.3d 
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955, 964 (2008). In Highland Enters., Inc. ,', Barker, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that the 
proper standard for the "knowledge of the expectancy" element necessary to make a claim of 
intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage is not actual knowledge. 133 
Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996,1004 (1999), Instead, the knowledge element may be "'satisfied 
by actual knowledge of the prospective [economic advantage] or by knowledge "of facts which 
would lead a reasonable person to believe that such interest exists." , Id. at 338-39, 986 P.2d at 
1004-05 (alteration and emphasis in the original) (quoting Kutcher v. Zimmennan, 87 Hawaii 
394,957 P.2d 1076, 1088 n. 16 (Haw.Ct.App.1998)). Intent may be demonstrated if it is shown 
that the actor desires to bring about the interference, or "knows that the interference is certain or 
substantially certain to occur as a result of his action." Id. at 340, 986 P .2d at 1006 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. d (1977)) "Intent can be shown even if the interference 
is incidental to the actor's intended purpose and desire 'but known to him to be a necessary 
consequence of his action.' ". Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. j. (1977)); 
Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 243 P.3d 1069 (2010). Based upon the 
facts and circumstances of this case, the Bank possessed knowledge that the success of the 
Southern Hills project depended upon the purchase of the Wood property and the ability of 
Jefferson and the other Morrison entities to financially succeed. The actions of the Bank 
intentionally, with full knowledge of the facts and contrary to its lending policies, caused the 
abrupt and devastating loss of financial viability to Jefferson. 
D. Fraud and Misrepresentation. 
The disputed material issues of fact in this case show that the Bank and its authOlized 
representatives owed a duty to Jefferson to speak the whole truth and to not intentionally mislead 
them or conceal material facts in communications regarding the tenns and conditions of the loan 
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or the Bank's ability and intention to further finance the Southern Hills project. The Bank and its 
officers made the materially false representation that the Bank had abrreed to accept a second lien 
position on the 80 Acre parcel allowing Jefferson to profit benefit from the existing favorable 
financing arrangement and to preserve its ability to use its liquid assets. The Bank intentionally 
or negligently concealed the fact that it would or could change its position on the 80 Acre parcel 
until Jefferson was out of time to exercise the Wood option stating to Jefferson, to Pam Wake, to 
the mortgage broker, and to others that the Board of Directors had approved the loan and agreed 
to accept the second priority position on the 80 Acre parcel. The Bank repudiated the agreement 
less than 48 hours prior to the loan closing and the expiration of the option to purchase the Wood 
property. 
The Bank, as part of the loan application, had been provided comprehensive financial 
statements concerning Morrison, Jefferson and the other related entities. The liquid assets shown 
in the financial statements were necessary for the approval of the loan and critical to the ability 
of Jefferson to perform its obligations to the Bank. With full knowledge of Jefferson's financial 
position, the Bank acted to cause the removal of the underlying liquid assets (used to pay off the 
prior lien holder on the 80 Acre parcel) and caused Jefferson and the other related parties to lose 
the ability to proceed with Southern Hills Development and other projects. The timing of the 
change of position prevented Jefferson from seeking other financing to fund the purchase of the 
Wood property. Steve Worton had represented that the liquid cash available to Jefferson would 
remain intact and not be affected by the new loan. After the Bank's sudden change in position, 
Steve Worton represented that the Bank would provide additional financing to alleviate the 
financial burden caused by its last minute change in position which required Jefferson to 
practically exhaust its reserve of liquid assets. Based upon the Bank's representation through its 
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officer and Vice President, Jefferson materially changed its position and used the liquid cash 
assets of Morrison and the related entities to payoff the first lien holder on the 80 Acre parcel. 
The Bank subsequently refused to provide financing to alleviate Jefferson's loss of working 
capital caused by the Bank's change of position just prior to the closing of the loan. All of the 
representations, acts of concealment and other acts of wrongful conduct were made by 
authorized representatives of the Bank, including but not limited to Steve Worton, with the intent 
or the reasonable expectation that Jefferson would rely thereon. In fact, Jefferson did rely upon 
such false information to its damage, loss and detriment. The Bank, its officers and its Board, 
based upon the above allegations, lacked reasonable grounds to believe that the representations 
to Jefferson and the facts it concealed contained true and accurate infom1ation and therefore 
acted with reckless disregard for Jefferson's rights knowing with reasonable probability that 
Jefferson and its related entities would be financially crippled by the Bank's actions. 
E. Promissory Estoppel. 
The District Court based its decision to deny relief on the basis of its determination that 
the Statute of Frauds barred the affirmative defense. The District Court stated that: "The Court 
has previously determined that Idaho Code §9-505 is the controlling law when it relates to any 
agreement regarding a promise or commitment to loan money. The Statute of Frauds requires 
a writing in order to enforce reliance upon agreed tenns. The Court has determined that no 
such pre-commitment writing existed and that only the loan agreement entered into by the 
Bank and Jefferson can be considered for pUlposes of reliance and enforceability. ,,16 
The District Court detennined that no pre-commitment writing existed and that only the 
loan agreement entered into by the Bank and Jefferson can be considered for purposes of reliance 
16 Memorandum Decision and Order, Clerk's Record p.648 
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and enforceability. However, the District Court erred when it did not consider the specific temlS 
and conditions of the Mortgage that allows for the security to have prior encumbrances of record. 
I"' The 80 Acre encumbrance was of record on May 9,2006. ' 
In order to demonstrate promissory estoppel, three elements must be met: '''( 1) the 
detriment suffered in reliance was substantial in an economic sense; (2) substantial loss to the 
promisee acting in reliance was or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and (3) the 
promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as made.' Brown v. 
City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 229 P.3d 1164, (2010). The undisputed facts in this case 
clearly establish that the Bank knew that Jefferson would rely on the Bank's representations 
relating to the financing of the original loan, the ten11S were incorporated into the Mortgage. 
Under the circumstances of this case and the facts presented, Jefferson's reliance was reasonable 
and justified. 
F. Damages. 
Jefferson suffered damages which were foreseeable and known to the Bank. Those 
damages include: 
1. The loss of the favorable terms of the 80 Acre financing agreement. 
2. The complete expenditure of Jefferson' operating capital and the financial impact the 
expenditure of the capital had on Jefferson's related entities. 
3. Jefferson's inability to muster the financial resources to complete the development of 
the Southem Hills subdivision. 
4. The destruction of Jefferson's and Jefferson's credit worthiness. 
Dustin Morrison established these damages in his deposition stating that: 
17 AFf. E. Polatis p.3, Clerk's Record p.552 
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3 One is I can't have my cash that's been spent 
4 reimbursed. The other thing is that they have approved 
5 this loan based on, No.1, my income and my capacity to 
6 earn. No.2, my liquidity and ability to debt service 
7 over time because we knew this project wouldn't generate 
8 a dime based on these numbers that I provided the bank 
9 as a break even point of year four or year seven. So it 
10 was going to require debt service for a period of time. 
11 Keep in mind the reimbursement wasn't to come 
12 to my pocket, it was to go to a CD to debt service the 
13 dam loan at Bank of Commerce. That's one issue, I can 
14 live without that issue. 
15 The problem was we have approved you based on 
16 your capacity to earn and your capacity to debt service 
17 this loan and now you fully acknowledge, Steve, 
18 everybody acknowledges there is not an option for 
19 subordination, guys. They are not going to just for 
20 free give up first position, we have to pay this off if 
21 we want first position. In order to pay that off we are 
22 going to liquidate our working capital, which will 
23 substantially affect our ability to earn because we are 
24 a spec home construction company, $700,000 borrows $3 
25 million; right? 20 percent, you know, so whatever, $3.5 
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1 million, I guess. 
2 Q. But you continued to operate after that, 
3 didn't you? 
4 A. No, we suffered, we bled, desperately. So 
5 when I told Steve this, you understand there is no way I 
6 can maintain my business without my working capital. 
7 That working capital will disappear if I do what you are 
8 asking me to do. If I don't do what you are asking me 
9 to do, I lose this project and every dime that I have 
10 spent on this project to date. IS 
The undisputed facts clearly establish that the Bank and its officers knew that the loan 
that they made to Jefferson would not have been approved without the reserve of working capital 
that was held by Jefferson and its related entities. I9 The Bank's vice president Steve Worton 
stated decisively that the Bank would not have approved the loan would not have been approved 
18 Depo. D. Morrison pp. 71-72, Clerk's Record p. 470 
19 Depo M. Morrison pp. 95-97 Clerks Record p. 83-385 
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by the Bank's Board of Directors knowing that the working capital of the Jefferson had been 
dismissed by over $700,000.00.:20 The Bank's unlawful breach of its agreements with Jefferson 
financially crippled Jefferson and directly caused the loss and damages described. 
G. Noyation. 
The Bank's Mortgage effective May 9, 2006 is not a change of the agreement to 
subordinate. The Mortgage allows for a subordination. The District Courts finding that a 
novation occurred in the transactions fonning the basis of this action is erroneous. The District 
Court found that: "Viewing these facts most favorably for Jefferson there were a series of 
novations that occurred which changed the terms of the original loan application by 
Jefferson, but ultimately Jefferson entered into a loan agreement with the Bank which 
extinguished all other pre-loan agreements that may have been contemplated by the parties. ,,21 
The making of a new contract does not necessarily abrogate a fonner contract unless it 
explicitly rescinds it, deals with the subject matter so comprehensively as to be complete in 
itself, or is so inconsistent with the first contract that the two cannot stand together. Moreover, 
when a subsequently executed agreement specifically references and relies on a fonner 
agreement, the two are to be interpreted together, if possible. Opportunity, L.L. C. v. Ossevvarde, 
136 Idaho 602, 38 PJd 1258, (2002). To establish an accord and satisfaction the parties 
accepting a new or different obligation must do so knowingly and intentionally. Heclonan v. 
Boise Valley Livestock Comm'n Co., 92 Idaho 862, 452 P.2d 359 (1969); Fairchild v. Mathews, 
91 Idaho 1,415 P.2d 43 (1966); Allan Steel Supply Co. v. Bradley, 89 Idaho 29, 402 P.2d 394 
20 Depo. S. Worton p. 73, Clerk's Record p. 73 
21 Memorandum Decision and Order p. 18 Clerk's Record p. 650 
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(1943). Harris v. \Vildcat Corp., 97 Idaho 884, 556 P.2d 67, (1976). Issues of fact arising from 
the circumstances of this case raise the issue of whether or not the elements necessary to find 
novation are present from the execution of the subsequent mortgages. The agreements were 
entered into with the understanding that the financial loss to Jefferson would be alleviated by the 
future acts of the Bartle The modification from the original agreement to loan money to Jefferson 
was not intentionally waived but was conditioned on the Bank's representations. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
The District Court's decision is not based on substantial evidence and incorrectly applies 
the law. The District Court's rulings and judgments should be reversed and this matter remanded 
for trial. The disputed facts establish that Jefferson's loan application which was adopted by the 
Bank clearly cOlmnunicated that the very favorable terms and conditions of the 80 Acre 
financing would remain in a priority position and that the Bank would take a subordinate 
position. Jefferson's loan application was in writing and provided specific infonnation about the 
80 Acre obligation. The Bank accepted the proposal without the condition of having a first 
mortgage on the 80 Acre parcel and the Mortgage prepared by the Bank recognizes that as of 
May 9,2006 that the Bank would be subordinate to existing encumbrances of record such as the 
80 Acre obligation. The Bank did not communicate in writing at any time prior the effective 
date of the Mortgage that it would require the 80 Acre loan to be subordinated to the Bank's 
mortgage. The Bank knew that the option to purchase the Wood property would expire on May 
10, 2006. Under the circumstances of this transaction, the Bank: knew that if the \Vood option 
was not timely exercised that Jefferson's ability to complete the Southern Hills development 
would be impossible. The Bank: knew that the 80 Acre lender would not have had any reason to 
subordinate its mortgage to the Bank: on new financing. The Bank: knew that by requiring the 
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payoff of the 80 Acre parcel that Jefferson's financial capacity and the financial capacity of the 
related entities would be severely and negatively impacted. In fact the Bank would not have 
approved the loan under circumstances that required Jefferson to deplete its working capital and 
the working capital of the related entities to close the loan. 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that the Orders and Judgments 
that are the subj ect 0 f this appeal be reversed and the matter be remanded for trial. 
Dated this 2nd day of November, 2012. 
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